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AIDS and the Sexual Offender: The
Epidemic Now Poses New Threats to the
Victim and the Criminal Justice System
I.

Introduction

"[W]hen the history of this time is written in America, it will
best be characterized by how we as a society confronted the multiple
challenges presented to us by AIDS."' Approximately 150,000 persons in the United States have been diagnosed with having AIDS or
HIV infection. 2 The National Institutes of Health have estimated
that approximately ten times the number of diagnosed and reported
cases, or 1,500,000 persons, are infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, more commonly known as AIDS. 3 However,
there is no way to tell exactly how many persons are infected be-

cause an infected person can remain asymptomatic for several
years." In fact, some patients may never manifest symptoms. 5 As a
result of these staggering statistics, the Surgeon General of the

United States has classified the disease as an epidemic." This epidemic has spawned a myriad of problems that society will most
likely have to confront well into the next century.
One of the most frightening and life-threatening problems associated with the AIDS epidemic is the possibility that the virus can
be transmitted to a victim during the course of a crime, especially
rape. Victims of sexual assault must confront tremendous psychological and physical problems in order to recover from the trauma of
victimization.7 The trauma resulting from a rape may last for fifteen
1. Panel discussion before the District of Columbia Circuit Court, Mandatory AIDS
Testing: Public Health and Privacy Rights, 124 F.R.D. 288, 289 (May 1988) [hereinafter
Panel Discussion] (remarks by Dr. Reed Vaughn Tuckson, Commissioner of Public Health for
the District of Columbia).
2. Telephone interview with Dr. Bobbie R. Jones, Director of Epidemiology, Bureau of
HIV-AIDS, Pennsylvania Center for Disease Control, Harrisburg, Pa. (Sept. 25, 1990) [hereinafter Interview with Dr. Bobbie R. Jones].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. C. Everett Koop, M.D., Sc. D., Surgeon General Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 3 (United States Department of Health and Human Services, Oct. 22,
1986).
7. Jane Nady Burnley, The Transmission of AIDS Through Sexual Assault: A Deadly

Problem in Search of a Policy, 12 NAT'L
1988).

ORG. FOR VICTIM AssISTANCE NEWSLETTER
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to twenty years after the assault. 8 Moreover, this emotional and
physical trauma is magnified many times by the fear of contracting
AIDS as a result of the attack.9
This Comment explores the problems that AIDS transmission
through sexual assault poses for the criminal justice system and examines the feasibility of solving these problems through mandatory
HIV testing of sexual offenders. First, this Comment discusses the
scope of the problem that the epidemic poses to the system. Second,
this Comment focuses on the constitutional and other interests implicated by a mandatory AIDS testing scheme. This Comment will
show that the appropriate judicial scrutiny to be applied to such a
scheme is a balancing test. Third, this Comment vill outline the victims' interest in and right to request that their attackers be tested for
HIV infection. When considering the constitutionality of a testing
standard, a court must weigh the victims' interests against the defendant's justifiable interests in not being compelled to submit to
testing. Finally, this Comment will examine the laws that have been
passed by some states to deal with the problem of AIDS and sexual
assault. These laws will be compared and contrasted in an attempt to
arrive at a solution that affords the best compromise between the
interests of the victims of sexual assault and the perpetrators of sexual assault.
II.

Background

In 1985, the FBI recorded 87,340 rapes.' 0 However, this number greatly underestimates the true scope of rape since it includes
only female victims over sixteen years of age and only those instances that were reported to the police. Government estimates suggest that for every rape reported to the police, thiree to ten rapes are
not reported, making rape one of the most under-reported crimes in
the United States."
A.

Risk of Transmission

At the present, there are no statistics regarding the risks of
transmission of the HIV virus through sexual assault. However,
there are studies and data available that make it possible to estimate
8.
9.

Id.
Id.

10. Report of the Presidential Commission on the Human Irrimunodeficiency Virus Epidemic 131 (June 24, 1988) [hereinafter Report of the Presidential Commission].
11. Id.
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the number of female rape victims who are likely to seroconvert as a
result of criminal activity.12 The majority of cases of heterosexual
transmission of the virus in the United States are from the male to
the female. 18 A recent study concluded that the likelihood of a fe-

male seroconverting as a result of a single act of unprotected heterosexual intercourse with an infected male is about 1 in 500." However, one must also consider the fact that the presence of physical
trauma,.,which usually accompanies rape, increases the risk of transmission.' 5 Physical trauma is likely to cause tears in the vaginal lining which facilitates transmission. 6 Likewise, when the assault involves sodomy, the risks of transmission are greater than 1 in 500

statistically.17 Another factor which may heighten the risk of transmission to rape victims is that many sexual offenders engage in
"high risk behavior."' 18
B.

Victim's Fears

In light of the foregoing discussion, it is not surprising that in
the last five years, an increasing number of female rape victims have
expressed fear of contracting AIDS and have sought referral for
testing.1 9 However, due to the nature of the AIDS virus and the
technology available, testing the victim is an inadequate response to
these fears. Because of the extended incubation period, and because
the tests used to diagnose the disease only detect the presence of

antibodies and not HIV itself, a newly infected victim will generally
not test positive until at least six to twelve weeks after the date of
exposure, and possibly longer.20 This would necessitate the victim be12. The term "seroconvert" refers to a positive HIV status on the part of a patient who
was previously uninfected with the virus. Marc Blumberg, Transmission of the AIDS Virus
Through Criminal Activity, 25 CRIM. LAW. BULL. 454, 456 n.15 (1989).
13. Women are more likely than men to contract HIV through heterosexual contact
because HIV is carried in seminal fluid which is produced in very large quantities in the male
during ejaculation. Conversely, women produce very little of the HIV carrying fluid during
sexual intercourse and, therefore, the chances of female to male transmission are much lower.
Interview with Dr. Bobbie R. Jones, supra note 2.
14. Norman Hearst & Stephen B. Hulleh, Preventing the Heterosexual Spread of
AIDS: Are We Giving Our Patients the Best Advice?, 259 J.A.M.A. 2429 (1988).
15. Interview with Dr. Bobbie R. Jones, supra note 2.
16. Interview with Dr. Bobbie R. Jones, supra note 2.
17. Interview with Dr. Bobbie R. Jones, supra note 2.
18. High risk behavior is classified as homosexual or bisexual activity or intravenous
drug use. Report of the Presidential Commission, supra note 9, at 131.
19. Burnley, supra note 7, at 1. This is based on reports from rape crisis counselors.
20. Blumberg, supra note 12, at 460. The most commonly used test to detect the presence of HIV antibodies is the enzyme linked immunosorbant assay (ELISA) test. In this test,
a patient's serum is added to a test tube containing relatively pure HIV proteins fixed to a
solid surface. Any anti-HIV antibodies in the serum become attached to HIV antigens fixed to
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ing tested more than once over a period of several months. Thus,

even with negative results, victims may still worry about seroconversion months or years later.
Because of the inadequacy of victim testing to deal with this
dilemma, many victims request that the sex offender be tested once
he is apprehended. 21 However, in most states theire is no legal apparatus in place to deal with these requests. In most states, defendants
in criminal cases cannot be'compelled to provide biological samples

unless the prosecution plans to use them as evidence of the crime. 2
Further, many states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws
that permit a plaintiff to sue for damages or to criminally prosecute
any individual who has disclosed a person's AIDS infection status
without that person's consent.2 3
the solid surface. The serum specimen is then washed away, removing antibodies not attached
to the solid surface. Subsequent steps produce a solution in the test tube whose color is proportionate to any remaining antibody. The appearance of color establishes that the patient's serum contained an antibody to at least one of the components of the .pure HIV protein preparation in the test tube. The ELISA test is used as an initial screening test, and a positive test
result will be checked by repeating the ELISA test on the same specimen once or twice. If the
repeat procedure yields a positive test result, the specimen will usually be subjected to a confirmatory test.
The most common confirmatory test is the Western Blot test. Like the ELISA test, the
Western Blot test detects the presence of HIV antibodies in blood. The Western Blot test
begins with a preparation of HIV antigens spread out on a special strip (a blot) in proportion
to their molecular weight. The patient's serum is then added to the blot, and anti-HIV antibodies become fixed to the HIV antigens that are fixed to the strip. After the patient's serum is
washed away, subsequent steps produce a black band wherever human antibody is adherent. A
reaction on the Western Blot indicates the presence of an antibody to one or more proteins of
precisely the molecular weights of the known HIV antigens. The more bands that appear, the
more likely the tested serum is from an HIV-infected person. Blots which show no bands are
considered negative.
There has been debate about how many bands need to be present for a positive test result.
The current FDA-licensed Western Blot requires a moderate or strong band at the location of
at least three HIV proteins. Blots which show some bands but do not meet this criteria are
considered indeterminate. MARTIN GUNDERSON ET. AL., AIDS TESTING AND PRIVACY 32-36
(1989).
21. William Glaberson, Fear of AIDS with Rape: How a Case Was Affected, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 1990, at B1.
22. A representative state law on the subject is that of New Jersey Rule of Evidence 25
which states:
[E]very natural person has a right to refuse to disclose in an action or to a police
officer or other official any matter that will incriminate him or expose him to a
penalty or a forfeiture of his estate, except that . . . no person has the privilege
to refuse to submit to examination for the purpose of discovering or recording his
corporal features and other identifying characteristics of his physical or mental
condition [.]
N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 84A-19 (1976).
23. See. e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.20 (West 1990); 35 D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 221 (West 1988). While most states do not have privacy statutes dealing specifically with
HIV status, most have general privacy laws that can be applied to H IV testing. See, e.g., NEW
YORK PUB. OFF. §§ 91-99 (McKinney 1988). Similarly, the federal government has no privacy
law specifically relevant to HIV testing, but the Privacy Act of 1974 covers the release of data
held by federal agencies and is broad enough to cover the HIV testing context. See 5 U.S.C. §
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C.

The Problem for the Criminal Justice System
As a result of this void in the criminal law, there now exists a

significant possibility that defense attorneys representing defendants
who refuse to be tested may abuse the criminal justice system. This

abuse could be characterized as an "AIDS-test plea bargain,"
whereby a defendant refuses to be tested until the prosecution agrees
to a lighter sentence or a lesser charge.
One such "AIDS-test plea bargain" was reported in the summer
of 1990 in New York City. 24 This case involved the highly publicized
rape of a Columbia University freshman by a dormitory security
guard in her dorm room in February of 1990.25 There was considerable interest in the outcome of the case due to the unusual nature of
the crime and the accompanying media attention. Given the fact

that the defendant had a prior criminal record and committed the
rape at knifepoint, many people were surprised to learn that his

guilty plea in March 1990 was accompanied by a promise from the
judge and the District Attorney's office that the defendant would receive a sentence of four to twelve years rather than the possible maximum of eight and a half to twenty-five years permitted by New
York law. 26 The reason for this arrangement 27 was that the victim,

being concerned for her health, requested the district attorney to
have the perpetrator tested. 28 Because no legal authority authorized

testing of the defendant against his will, the district attorney agreed
to the lighter sentence in exchange for the testing of the defendant.29
Because these arrangements are most often kept secret, there is no
way to know for sure how many "AIDS-test plea bargains" have
been made. Several legal experts have indicated that with the publicity surrounding the Columbia rape case, more defense attorneys may
refuse to have their clients tested without a promise of lenient
552a (1980).
24. See Glaberson, supra note 21.
25. Guard is Arrested in Rape of Student, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1990, at B2.
26. Elliot Pinsley, Manhattan D.A. Deals Sentence for AIDS Test, MANHATTAN LAWYER, July/August 1990, at 1.
27. The arrangement was made in March 1990, and was disclosed publicly only as a
result of an unidentified leak in the District Attorney's Office in July 1990. Id.
28. Id.
29. In October 1987, New York District Attorney Robert Morgenthau appeared and
expressed his views on the matter before a subcommittee on AIDS at the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York. He expressed serious doubts about testing rape defendants for
AIDS explaining, "Unless a blood test will provide evidence of a crime, my office has no
authority to seek it." Morgenthau also stated that he believed that such testing would provide
"little useful information" citing the facts that the presently available HIV test only detects
antibodies which may not be produced for up to a year after infection, and that the disease will
not necessarily be transmitted through a single sexual contact. Id. at 27.
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treatment.3 0
Cases like the Columbia University incident have prompted
lawmakers in several states to consider the feasibility of enacting
legislation that would require sexual offenders to submit to an AIDS
test and release the results to the victims at their request. Presently,
only nine states have laws requiring rape defendants or convicts to
submit to HIV testing.3 ' Regardless of when HIV testing is required,
these laws are subject to valid concerns. Laws that require testing of
offenders after their conviction raise questions of constitutional due
process and privacy rights.32 Laws that require testing of defendants
prior to their conviction raise further questions concerning society's
deeply rooted notion that a defendant is presumed innocent until
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.3 3 To ultimately decide
whether the government should be empowered to force rapists to
submit to AIDS testing, the courts will have to balance the rights of
the victim against the rights of her alleged or convicted assailant.
III.

Search & Seizure Aspects

The United States Supreme Court has held that the removal of
blood or other natural substances from the body of a defendant without consent is a search and seizure.' In order for a search and
seizure to be constitutional, it must be reasonable. 5 Specifically, the
Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and affects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to
be seized.3 6
Guard Is Arrested in Rape of Student, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1990, at B2.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.96 (West 1990); CAL. PENAL CODE §
1524.1 (West 1990); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.1 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-415
(1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.609 (West 1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3
(Smith-Hurd 1990); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 21.31 (Vernon 1989); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.24.340 (1990); W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-2 (1990); IND. CODE § 35-38-1-10.5 (Burns 1990).
32. Colorado, Texas, Florida and California.
33. Illinois, West Virginia, Washington.
34. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (This case dealt with the forcible
removal of blood to be tested for alcohol after the driver was arrested for driving under the
influence.).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
36. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9. The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
30.
31.

searches and seizures now applies to the states as one of the fundamental rights protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
27-28 (1949).
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A.

The Warrant Requirement and Exceptions

The Fourth Amendment prohibits only those searches that are
unreasonable.3 7 For a search to be "reasonable," the Supreme Court
has generally required that the search be conducted pursuant to a

warrant issued by a neutral and detached judge or magistrate upon a
showing of probable cause. 38 The Court has, however, recognized exceptions to the probable cause and warrant requirements. These exceptions include searches incident to arrest,3 9 pat-down searches of

persons whose conduct leads a police officer to conclude that they are
armed,"' searches of motor vehicles under exigent circumstances,4 1
inventory searches or automobiles in policy custody,42 and administrative searches of heavily regulated businesses. 3
Most cases dealing with the reasonableness of searches and bodily intrusion have arisen in the realm of criminal law. The laws of
most states do not allow the taking of a bodily substance from a
defendant unless it will be used as evidence against the defendant, as
in the taking of a hair sample to match the hair found at a crime
scene. 44 The taking of blood for an AIDS test at the request of a
crime victim usually does not fall within the statutory language because ordinarily the suspect will have already been apprehended and

identified, and the blood will be used only for the purpose of informing the victim of her exposure to the virus and not as evidence of a

crime. 5
Because no criminal charges are expected to be filed as a result
of the information gleaned from the AIDS test, the most analogous
search cases relating to the legality of compulsory HIV testing are
37. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
38. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971).
39. Chimmel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
40. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
41. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
42. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976).
43. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972).
44. See, e.g., supra note 22 and accompanying text.
45. Some legal experts believe that the intentional exposure of another to the AIDS
virus should be criminalized. Indeed some states have made it a criminal offense. See, e.g., ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (Smith-Hurd 1990). However, to compel an HIV test for
evidence of such a crime, probable cause that the defendant is infected with HIV must exist.
Since most HIV infected persons are asymptomatic, it will often be extremely difficult to meet
this burden. One foreseeable exception, however, would be if the defendant brought the subject
up to the victim during the attack - thereby bringing his HIV status into question. However,
this issue is beyond the scope of this comment. Even if blood is taken from a defendant for
purposes of proving his link to the crime, a test for HIV antibodies still could not be performed
since this would be an additional invasion into one's privacy requiring further justification.
However, the fact that the blood had already been drawn would lessen the extent of the physical intrusion weighed in any balancing analysis.
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cases involving administrative searches. In cases addressing the reasonableness of administrative searches, the Supreme Court has held
that a less stringent probable cause requirement will apply for obtaining a search warrant."
B. Administrative Searches: Analogous Precedents
The administrative search standard was first applied by the Supreme Court in conjunction with the taking of a bodily substance in
the drug testing case of Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
Ass'n.47 The Supreme Court held that neither a warrant nor probable cause are irreducible requirements of a valid search and seizure,
and that neither are required where governmental interests present
special needs "beyond [those of] normal law enforcement." 48 Further, in limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated
by the search are minimal and an important governmental interest
furthered by the search would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite
the absence of such a suspicion.' 9
The Court in Skinner enunciated a balancing test to measure
the permissibility of a particular search that considers all the circumstances surrounding the search and the nature of the search itself. The balancing test weighs the "intrusion on the individual's
fourth amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate gov50
ernmental interests.
The drug testing scheme challenged in Skinner was deemed reasonable and constitutional. 51 The Court noted that the drug tests
were prescribed to prevent accidents and protect the public safety by
ensuring that railway employees remain drug free. 52 The taking of
blood samples was considered a minimal intrusion since such "tests
are commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations.15 3
Moreover, "the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and . . . for

most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma or pain"
when conducted by a physician in a hospital environment according
to accepted medical practices. 5" The Court also observed that the
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
Id. at 620.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 619 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
Id. at 624.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 621 (1989).
Id. at 625 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).
Id.

NEw AIDS THREATS
employee's expectations of privacy were "diminished because they
participated in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure
safety." 5 5 The Court then weighed these factors against the compelling governmental interests in preventing accidents caused by alcohol
or drug impairment, and in ensuring the safety of the public and the
employees themselves.5 6 After balancing these factors, the Court determined that the testing was reasonable.
In numerous contexts, the Supreme Court has used the concept
of "special need" to uphold searches involving special circumstances
that make the warrant or probable cause requirements impracticable. One such context is searches of students conducted by school
officials. 57 Citing Terry v. Ohio,58 the Court stated in New Jersey v.
T.L.O.59 that the determination of the reasonableness of a search is
to be made after a two prong inquiry. First, it must be determined
whether the search was justified at its inception.6 ° Second, the court
must inquire as to whether the search, as conducted, was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in
the first place.6 In T.L.O., a school official had a report from a
teacher that the student in question had been smoking on school
property.6" The Court held that the official's search was justified at
its inception because it was reasonable to believe that such a search
would produce evidence of a violation of school policy-namely, possession of cigarettes.6 3 Therefore, since the scope of the search was
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and was not excessively intrusive in light of the student's age and nature of the infraction, the search was deemed reasonable. 6
The courts also weigh the severity of the intrusion in determining its reasonableness. For example, in Winston v. Lee,65 the police
department desired to surgically remove a bullet from a suspect. 6
The Supreme Court weighed the nature of the intrusion and the extent to which it would endanger the life or health of the defendant
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
student's
65.
66.

Id. at 627.
Id. at 620-21.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
Id.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 345.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985). The search was limited to the
person.
470 U.S. 753 (1985).
Id. at 761-63.

96

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

FALL

1991

against the benefit to be gleaned from the evidence discovered. 67 The

Court held that since the procedure required anesthesia and the need
for the information was not compelling in light of other available
evidence, the intrusion was "unreasonable."

68

C. Administrative Searches and AIDS Testing: The Importance of

"Nexus"
Another important factor courts consider when determining the
reasonableness of administrative searches is the "'nexus" between the
search and the governmental interest sought to be advanced. 69 One
AIDS testing scheme that has been struck down because of the lack
of such a nexus was the scheme challenged in Glover v. Eastern Ne70
braska Community Office of Retardation.
Glover involved a multi-

county health services agency that had adopted a policy requiring
certain employees to submit to mandatory testing for AIDS and hepatitis B.71 The purpose of the policy was to ensure that patients at
the facility did not catch the diseases from employees. 7 The operators of the facility were concerned that the patients might contract
the diseases if employees were bitten by the patients.7 The court of
appeals applied a factual analysis to the testing scheme in order to
determine its legitimacy. 7 ' The court of appeals also considered the
extensive medical evidence heard by the district court regarding the

diseases and how they are transmitted.

5

The court found it to be especially important that the virus is

not transmitted through casual contact.

6

Upon examination of the

67. Id. at 755.
68. Id. at 766. These considerations should not play a larg.e role in the analysis of an
AIDS testing scheme. In both Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) and Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), the Court noted that blood tests have
become routine and that society does not view blood tests as unduly extensive impositions on
an individual's personal privacy or bodily integrity.
69. Panel Discussion, supra note 1.
70. 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989).
71. Id. at 462.
72. The facility treated mentally retarded persons. Id.
73. Id. at 463.
74. Id. at 464.
75. Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461, 463
(8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989). The evidence showed that the AIDS virus
ispresent in semen, vaginal and cervical secretions, blood, breast milk and, in rare instances,
tears and saliva. The primary routes of transmission are via sexual contact, intravenous drug
use, blood transfusions, across the placenta from mother to fetus, through mother's milk, by
prolonged exposure of broken skin to massive amounts of infected blood, and, less frequently,
through hospital accidents involving needle-sticks or contact with massive amounts of infected
materials. Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation, 686 F. Supp. 243,
244 (D. Neb. 1988), affid, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989).
76. Glover, 867 F.2d at 463.
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data the court of appeals upheld the district court's ruling that the
risk of retarded patients contracting either disease from the employees was "minuscule, trivial, extremely low, extraordinarily low, theoretical, and approaches zero."' 77 Because of the lack of factual support, the AIDS testing policy failed the "reasonable at its inception"
prong of the analysis, since the negligible risk of transmission could
not justify mandatory testing of employees for the purpose of protecting patients.78
In Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court of California, the California
Court of Appeals reached an opposite conclusion when it heard a
challenge to a California law requiring mandatory AIDS testing for
criminal defendants.7 9 The law being challenged required any person
charged with a crime that involved interfering "with the official duties of a peace Officer by biting . . .or transferring blood or other

bodily fluids on, upon, or through the skin or membranes of a peace
officer

. .

. [to] provide two specimens of blood for testing

. .

. [for

virus]." 80

the AIDS
In order to determine the reasonableness of the search necessitated by biting incidents, the court considered medical evidence on
the transmission of HIV, particularly through saliva or biting incidents.81 The experts declared that although HIV is present in small
quantities in human saliva, there were no documented cases of HIV
transmission through saliva and no evidence of infections in individuals exposed to the saliva of an infected person.82 On the other hand,
because of the uncertain state of medical knowledge concerning HIV
and AIDS, "When HIV infected saliva comes into contact with subcutaneous tissue and/or the blood of another, it cannot be said categorically that HIV could not be transmitted ... -8.Therefore, the

court deemed it to be "theoretically possible" that transmission of
the virus could occur in this manner.8 '
77. Id. (quoting Glover, 686 F. Supp. at 251).
78. Id.
79. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Ct. of San Francisco, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990). California has four statutes that require rape defendants and also those charged with
biting peace officers, convicted prostitutes and other convicted sex offenders to submit to the
tests. See infra notes 199-218 and accompanying text for a discussion of the California statues
that relate to rape. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6 (West 1990) (requiring mandatory
testing of defendants convicted of prostitution or related offenses).
80. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 199.97 (West 1990). The person challenging the
law had been accused of inflicting a deep bite on the arm of a bailiff who was removing her
from a courtroom after she had become disruptive. Johnetta J., 267 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
81. Johnetta J., 267 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 671.
84. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Ct. of San Francisco, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 671 (Cal. Ct.
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The court in Johnetta J. held that this theoretical possibility

was enough to justify the search.85 The Glover case was distinguished because in Johnetta J. the person to be protected was the
person being bitten, whereas in Glover the person to be protected
was doing the biting and because Glover was decided before the
Skinner decision.8" The Johnetta J. court also noted that Glover in-

volved an administrative policy instead of a statute and did not involve the special need of protecting the health and safety of law enforcement officers.87
IV.

Right to Privacy

Another constitutional doctrine that is implicated by mandatory
AIDS testing schemes is"the right to privacy. The Supreme Court
has recognized that the United States Constitution clearly protects
certain areas of personal privacy. The Court has recognized two different kinds of privacy interests. One is the privacy interest in making certain kinds of important decisions independently.88 Another is
the individual privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. 89 The latter interest is the one that will most likely apply to any
consideration of mandatory AIDS testing of rape defendants since

the results of the test will necessarily be disclosed to the victim.
A.

Right to Privacy in One's Medical Status
In order to determine the constitutionality of an AIDS testing

scheme, the inquiry must begin with the question of whether one's
medical health is a "personal matter" that the right to privacy will
protect. Several courts have ruled that one's medical records are

within the ambit of the right to privacy. United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.90 held that information about one's body and
App. 1990).
85. Id. at 682.
86. Id.
87. Id. The Johnetta J. case was not appealed any further than the Supreme Court of
California. Given the fact that the "special need" involved in a bik:ing incident is based only on
the theoretical possibility of transmission, it is questionable whether the Supreme Court of the
United States would find the testing scheme reasonable. However, there is a much stronger
case for testing in the rape context since the chances of transmission through sexual contact
are far from theoretical.
88. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 588 (1897). These cases deal mainly with matters relating to marriage, procreation, conception, family relationships and child rearing.
89. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
90. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
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state of health is a matter that the individual is ordinarily entitled to
retain within the "private enclave where he may lead a private
life."'" The court noted that medical records and information are on
a different plane than other relevant material.9" As an example, the
court pointed to the fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
impose a higher burden for discovery of reports of the physical and
mental condition of a person than for discovery in general.93 In
Whalen v. Roe,94 the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of
a constitutional right of privacy against disclosure of private matters
but did not define its contours.9"
Even those courts that have recognized a right to privacy in
one's medical status have also recognized that this right is not absolute and must yield upon a showing of proper governmental interests. 9 In Hawaii Psychiatric Society v. Arivoshi,7 a federal district
court enunciated a test to be applied when the right to privacy in
one's medical status was violated. 98 This test balanced the states' interests served by the regulation against the extent of the intrusion
into an individual's privacy. 99 The court held this to be the appropriate test to apply to the "confidentiality" strand of the right to privacy, even though the "autonomy" strand of the right to privacy
triggers the compelling interest standard. 00 This dichotomy stems
from the Supreme Court's recognition that matters falling within the
autonomy zone affect the most fundamental personal decisions and
relationships.' 0' Since the matters falling within the confidentiality
zone are not of such a highly sensitive nature, a less stringent test is
necessary. 02 Nonetheless, as the sensitivity of the personal information to be disclosed and the intrusion on the right of confidentiality
increases, the burden on the state to justify a disclosure increases
91. Id. at 577 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir.
1956) (Frank, J.,dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)).
92. Id.

93. Id.
94.
95.

429 U.S. 589 (1977).
United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980).

Other cases where a right of privacy in one's medical or mental conditions has been recognized
include: In Re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983);
Hawaii Psychiatric v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Haw. 1979).
96. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577.
97. 481 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Haw. 1979).
98. Id. at 1043.
99. Id.
100. Id.

101.
102.

Id.
Hawaii Psychiatric v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1043 (D. Haw. 1979).
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proportionally under the balancing test."°8
Although not clearly enunciated, this balancing test was applied
0
when it evaluated the
by the Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe"'
constitutionality of several New York statutes. These statutes required that copies of every prescription for certain drugs be provided
to the state because of the state's concern that prescription drugs
were being diverted into illegal channels.' 0 5 The reporting statute required, among other things, that the patient's name, drug prescriptions and dosage be reported to the state.' 00 Public disclosure of the
identity of the patients was prohibited by statute and by a department of health regulation.'
The asserted state interest was the desire to minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs, 0 8 and the law was enacted to serve this goal
by having a deterrent effect on potential violators.' 0 9 The individuals
challenging the statute claimed that the scheme violated both the
"confidentiality" and "automony" strands of the right to privacy." 0
They believed that there was a possibility that the information would
be publicly disclosed, which would make some patients and doctors
reluctant to utilize such drugs."'
While recognizing the privacy interests of patients in personal
medical information, the Court concluded that the law did not violate the Constitution." 2 Important to the Court's determination was
the very compelling interest of the state in protecting the health of
its citizens coupled with the lack of a real intrusion into the patients'
privacy interests."' The Court reasoned that no real privacy intrusion occurred because the information was not to be disclosed and
adequate safeguards were already in place, thereby making the risk
of disclosure minimal." 4
Another important aspect of the Whalen decision was that the
5
Court explicitly rejected the holding of Lochner v. New. York."
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
was to be
protected
115.

Id.
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
Id. at 591.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 597-98.
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977).
Id. at 600.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977). The information received by the state
stored in computers and a vault inside a room surrounded by a locked wire fence and
by an alarm system. See id. at 593-94.
198 U.S. 45 (1905). The holding in Lochner had been implicitly rejected in the
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Lochner held that the state must prove that interferences with per-

sonal liberty are necessary in order to pass constitutional scrutiny. 116
Whalen reemphasized the notion that "individual states have broad
latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital
local concern." 1 7 The Court cited Justice Brandeis' comment on
"social experimentation" from his dissenting opinion in New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann,"8 in which he cautioned the judiciary against
striking down legislation that appears unreasonable, but may actu-

ally prove to be a beneficial solution to a social problem.11 9 The Supreme Court's affinity for social experimentation could well have an
impact on decisions regarding AIDS testing due to the magnitude of
the problem that the epidemic poses for society.
1. Medical Ethics and the Right to Privacy.-The balancing

test approach regarding privacy intrusions into an individual's medical status is consistent with the ethical doctrines that surround the
doctor-patient privilege. It has long been established in'the medical
field that the communications between doctor and patient are confi-

dential. Upon entering into the profession, every doctor promises
that anything he "may see or hear in the course of the treatment
. . .[he] will keep to [himself], holding such things shameful to be

spoken about. 120 The American Medical Association incorporated
these beliefs into its first code of ethics in 1847.121 Furthermore, the
current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of
the American Medical Association state that the "information disearlier cases of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482 (1965); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963); and FHA v. Darlington, Inc.
358 U.S. 84, 92 (1958).
116. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56.
117. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977).
118. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
119. To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences
to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This
Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute
which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable. We have power to do this, because the due process
clause has been held by the Court applicable to matters of substantive law as
well as to matters of procedure. But in the exercise of this high power, we must
be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we
would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J.,dissenting) (footnote omitted).
120. Oath of Hippocrates, cited in GARY ANDERSON, HEALTH CARE ETHICS 323 (1987).
121. Troyen A. Brennan, AIDS and the Limits of Confidentiality, 4 J. OF GEN. INTERNAL MED.

242 (1988).
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closed to a physician during the course of the relationship between

physician and patient is confidential to the greatest possible
degree." 12' 2
The medical community has, however, recognized several excep-

tions to the rule of strict doctor-patient confidentiality. For example,
the American Medical Association acknowledges that confidentiality
may yield when it conflicts with the rights of an innocent third
party. 12 3 Therefore, although medical ethics generally require confidentiality, a physician may break this confidence if an innocent third
party is seriously threatened. Before breaking confidentiality, a doctor must consider the nature of the threat to the third person, as well
as the manner in which any disclosure will disrupt his relationship
" ' This analysis is very
with the patient.12
similar to the balancing test
applied by courts when deciding whether an intrusion upon privacy
is too great to withstand a constitutional challenge.
2. Unique Considerations of the AIDS Epidemic.-In applying a balancing test to situations where AIDS test results are dis-

closed to a third person, one must take into account the unusual
ramifications that accompany such disclosure which are not normally
present when other medical information is released. HIV infection is
most prevalent among homosexual'or bisexual men and intravenous

drug users. 2 This, coupled with the fact that AIDS is currently incurable and almost always fatal, 26 has led to panic in the general
population and discrimination against those who are infected with
HIV. Such persons experience discrimination in the work place, as

well as in housing, health care and public accommodation. 2 7 Evidence also exists that prison inmates with HIV positive status will

face discrimination and abuse in jail.128 Although these considera122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Of all reported adult HIV infections, 91% occurred in men. Of those men, 68 were
homosexual or bisexual non-intravenous drug users; 9% were honosexual or bisexual intravenous drug users; 2% were heterosexuals who had sexual contact with females at risk for HIV
infection; 2% had blood component exposure; and 1% had coagulation factor concentrate exposure. Of the female adult cases reported, 52% were intravenous drug users; 30% had sexual
contact with men at risk for HIV infection; and 11 % had blood component exposure. Therefore, the infection is most prevalent in homosexual and bisexual males and intravenous drug
users. MARTIN GUNDERSON ET.AL., AIDS: TESTING AND PRIVACY 13-14 (1989) (citing reports
of Centers for Disease Control as of January 30, 1989) [hereinafter GUNDERSON].

126. See
127. See

GUNDERSON,
GUNDERSON,

supra note 125, at 1.
supra note 125, at 1.

128. In the case of LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983), a
group of healthy New York State prison inmates sought a mandatory injunction requiring
HIV anti-body screening and segregation of those inmates testing positive for HIV within the
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tions should be weighed in the balancing equation, AIDS does not
confer any greater constitutional rights on those infected than on patients afflicted with other infectious or fatal diseases such as herpes,
tuberculosis, or cancer." 9
V.

Presumption of Innocence

Another concern is raised by laws requiring an accused rapist to
undergo testing for HIV infection before he has been convicted of
the charge. Some have stated that these laws impugn the presumption of innocence to which every defendant is entitled under the laws
of the United States. 1 0 The "presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."' 31 Some legal scholars claim that this principle, which has
been part of our legal system since its inception, can be traced back
to Deuteronomy and the laws of Sparta and Athens.' 32 Without
doubt, the presumption of innocence was present as early as the Legal Code of Rome.' While not specifically expressed in the books of
the common law until 1802,1" the "practice which flowed from [the
presumption of innocence] existed in the common law from the earliest time."' 35
In Coffin v. United States,'36 Justice White defined the presumption of innocence as "a conclusion drawn by the law in favor of
the citizen by virtue whereof, when brought to trial upon a criminal
charge, he must be acquitted unless he is proven to be guilty."'3 7
More simply stated, a defendant is presumed innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Those who oppose testing of rape defendants before conviction
claim that the right to be presumed innocent is violated when the
accused is forced to give his blood and AIDS test results to a victim
based on the allegations of rape. 38 However, recent court decisions
general population of the prison. Id. at 305.
129. Plowman v. United States Dep't of the Army, 698 F. Supp. 627, 632 n.20 (E.D.

Va. 1988).
130. California, Colorado, Florida, and Texas statutes permit pre-conviction testing of
accused sexual offenders. See infra notes 189-216 and accompanying text.
131. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
132. See id. at 454 (citation omitted).
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id.
See id. at 455.
See id.
156 U.S. 432 (1895).
See id. at 458-59.
Dennis Moore, Victims v. Offenders with AIDS: Balancing Rights, NAT'L ORG. OF
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regarding the rights of pre-trial detainees and forfeiture of assets of
accused drug traffickers suggest that this argument is not very
strong, especially when the urgent needs and rights of a rape victim
are factored into the analysis.
A. Doctrine Limited: Pretrial Detainee and Criminal Forfeiture
Cases
In the case of Bell v. Wolfish, 13 9 pretrial detainees challenged
the allegedly unconstitutional conditions in a New York City correctional center. 140 The Supreme Court held that the presumption of
innocence provides no support for the rule that a pretrial detainee
has a substantive right to be free from conditions of confinement that
are not justified by compelling necessity. 14 ' The court stated that:
The presumption of innocence is a doctrine that allocates the
burden of proof in criminal trials; it also may serve as an admonishment to the jury to judge an accused's guilt or innocence
solely on the evidence adduced at trial and not on the basis of
suspicions that may arise from the fact of his arrest, indictment,
or custody, or from other matters not introduced as proof at
trial. It is "an inaccurate, shorthand description of the right of
the accused to 'remain inactive and secure, until the prosecution
has taken up its burden and produced evidence and effected persuasion; . . .' an 'assumption' that is indulged in the absence of
contrary evidence."142
The holding in Wolfish prohibits pretrial detainees from predicating constitutional challenges on the presumption of innocence. 143
Despite the important role that the presumption of innocence plays
in our criminal justice system, the presumption "'has no application
to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun."'4" This idea has been noted in
VICTIMS ASSISTANCE NEWSLETTER 3 (1988).

139.

441 U.S. 520 (1979).

140. Id. at 520. The challenged conditions included, inter alia, the practice of housing
two inmates in rooms originally intended for single occupancy; the enforcement of a rule
prohibiting inmates from receiving hard-cover books that are not mailed directly from publishers, book stores, or book clubs; the prohibition against inmates' receipt of packages of food or
personal items from outside the institution; the practice of body cavity searches and inmates
following contact visits with persons from outside the institution; and the requirement that
pretrial detainees remain outside their rooms during routing inspections by guards. The District Court and the Court of Appeals held that these conditions would only be constitutional if
prison officials could show a "compelling necessity" for their existence. Id.
141. Id. at 532.
142. See id. at 533 (citation omitted).
143. See Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d 64, 71 (3d Cir. 1981).
144. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
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earlier cases. For example, Justice Frankfurter once commented that
"[ijf the 'presumption of innocence' is read literally to apply to all
pretrial procedures, it is impossible to justify bail or pretrial detention, both of which are restraints upon an accused despite the
145
presumption."
More recently, the question of the role of the presumption of
innocence has arisen in cases where courts require forfeiture of assets of defendants accused of violating the Racketeer Influence and
Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statute14 and the Continuing
Criminal Enterprise ("CCE") statute. 147 The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 ("1984 Act") 148 strengthened the forfeiture provisions of these two laws. The 1984 Act permits judges to issue restraining orders before trial that prohibit defendants from
transferring property subject to forfeiture149 in order to prevent the
assets from being dissipated before the final disposition of the
0
case.1
One of the challenges the criminal defense bar and other commentators have lodged against the law is that the freezing of a defendant's assets, and labeling them "forfeitable" based upon an assumption that they were derived from criminal activity, deprives the
defendant of the presumption of innocence.'' Despite this allegation,
the court in United States v. Nichols, 52 held that the forfeiture act
did not violate the defendant's right to be presumed innocent for two
reasons: first, government must prove a forfeiture allegation in an
indictment in the same manner that it must prove any other allegation in an indictment; and second, the decision concerning whether
the property will actually be forfeited is not determined until trial. 58
The court also noted that the presumption of innocence has no application to the determination of the rights of a defendant before trial
145.

Sistrunk, 646 F.2d at 64 (quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 803-03 (1952)

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
146.
147.
148.

18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982, Supp. III 1985 & Supp. IV 1980).
21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (1982, Supp. III 1985 & Supp. IV 1986).
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).

149.

Property subject to forfeiture is that proven to be derived from criminal activity at

trial. The law effectively "freezes" the assets of the defendant until after the trial. The Justice
Department has now extended the law to include the money to be paid by the defendant to his
defense attorney. This raises Sixth Amendment right to counsel challenges. William R. Cowden, Note, Attorney Fee Forfeiture under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: If It
Works Don't Fix It, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 535, 536-37 (1988).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988).
153. Id. at 1500.
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and relied on the reasoning of Bell v. Wolfish fo:r its decision.1 54 In
light of this discussion, the presumption of innocence will not be a
barrier to compelling rape defendants to submit to AIDS testing
before they have been convicted.
VI.

The Victims' Needs and Rights

Other considerations that must be weighed when assessing the
constitutionality of mandatory AIDS testing for sexual offenders include the rights and needs of the rape victim. A rape victim faces
varied physical and emotional repercussions as the result of the assault.1 55 "The spectre of AIDS and the possibility that it was transmitted to the victim in the course of a crime adds yet another frightening and life-threatening dimension to the crime victim's plight. 1 5 6
Because of its very nature, sexual assault can result in the transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus.
A.

Why Victims Request Testing

The foregoing discussion explains why most rape victims want
to know if their attackers can be tested for AII)S.1 57 According to
one authority, "It's an issue that comes up increasingly in [rape]
counseling sessions." 58 The first reason why a victim might want the
accused tested for HIV relates to the victim's emotional well-being.
For instance, the victim's concern regarding the: HIV status of her
attacker would be alleviated if the accused could be tested after apprehension and the results could be made known to the victim. 159
This is especially important since testing of the victim will be inconclusive for several months after the attack.1 60 The victim might also
want to know whether she has been exposed to the virus so that she
can take precautions and make changes in her own lifestyle, so as
not to infect those close to her.1 61 A victim would certainly want to
engage in "safe sex" practices with her spouse and would have to
1 62
seriously consider whether or not to risk pregnancy.
154.
155.
156.

Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979)),
Burnley, supra note 7, at 1.
Burnley, supra note 7, at 1.

157. Remarks of Susan Xenarios, Director of the Rape Intervention Program at St.
Luke's Roosevelt Hospital, printed in MANHATTAN LAWYER, July/August 1990, at 27.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
placenta.

Id.
Burnley, supra note 7, at 2.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
Burnley, supra note 7, at 3.
One of the primary modes of transmission is from a mother to her fetus via the
GUNDERSON, supra note 125, at 55. Studies have shown that women infected with
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1. Experimental Treatment.-A more controversial reason for

a victim's desire to have her attacker tested is that she may want to
seek experimental treatment. 163 Recent studies have shown that the
"prophylactic" use of the drug AZT (Zidovudine) shortly after exposure to the AIDS virus has succeeded in "freezing" the development of the virus in laboratory rats. 16' In light of these promising
studies, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases has
strongly recommended that all individuals who test positive for HIV
but are asymptomatic and who have CD4 lymphocyte counts below
500 submit to AZT therapy. 6 Some physicians also believe that

AZT prophylaxis therapy should be offered to health care workers
who have experienced "occupational exposures."' 66 These physicians
cite the following reasons in support of their belief: (1) the severity

of the illness that may result from HIV infection; (2) the documented anti-viral effect of AZT in the treatment of persons with established HIV infection; (3) the apparent reversibility of acute toxicity in persons taking AZT for a brief period; and (4) AZT post
61 7
exposure may modify the course of some retroviral infections.
Unfortunately, there are problems and side effects associated
HIV increase their chances of developing a full-blown case of AIDS by 50% if they expose
their bodies to the stress related to pregnancy and childbirth. See Burnley, supra note 7, at 3.
163. Elliot Pinsley, Manhattan D.A. Deals Sentence For AIDS Test, MANHATTAN LAWYER, July/August 1990, at 37.

164.

Centers for Disease Controls 39

MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT

13

(January 26, 1990) [hereinafter MORBIDITY]. Studies of immunodeficient mice with immune
systems reconstituted with transplanted human hematolymphoid organs susceptible to HIV
were performed. Seventeen mice were treated with AZT (Zidovudine) for 24 hours before and
for two weeks after intrathymic injection of a standard challenge does of HIV. Two weeks
after injection, none of these mice tested positive for HIV DNA. Four weeks after AZT therapy was stopped, all the mice tested positive for HIV DNA. In comparison, all 40 of the mice
used in the study that were not given AZT therapy tested positive for HIV DNA two weeks
after exposure. Id.
165. Report of the State-of-the-Art Conference, sponsored by the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Disease of the National Institute of Health, at 1 (March 30, 1990).
166. Occupational exposure (i.e., exposure that occurs during the performance of job
duties) that may place a worker at risk of HIV infection is defined as a percutaneous injury
(e.g., a needlestick or cut with a sharp object), contact of mucous membranes, or contact of
skin (especially when the exposed skin is chapped, abraded, or afflicted with dermatitis or the
contact is prolonged or involving an extensive area) with blood, tissues, or other body fluids to
which universal precautions apply, including: a) semen, vaginal secretions, or other body fluids
contaminated with visible blood, because these substances have been implicated in the transmission of HIV infection; b) cerebrospinal fluid, synovial fluid, pleural fluid, peritoneal fluid,
pericardial fluid, and amniotic fluid, because the risk of transmission of HIV from these fluids
has not yet been determined; and c) laboratory specimens that contain HIV (e.g., suspensions
of concentrated virus) in a health care environment. MORBIDITY, supra note 164, at 1.
167. MORBIDITY, supra note 164, at 6. Data collected in an ongoing Centers for Disease
Control Surveillance project of health-care workers who have been occupationally exposed to
blood from HIV infected patients indicate that during the period April-December 1989, ten, or
8
percent of 151 newly enrolled participants began a post exposure regime of AZT. MORBIDITY,

supra note 164, at 1.
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with AZT prophylaxis treatment. First, the cost is extremely high.16 8
Second, AZT is highly toxic to those who have symptomatic HIV

infection." 9 The toxicity level in those participating in treatment after occupational exposure is lower, however, and the most common
complaints are nausea and vomiting.170 In animal studies involving
AZT, the drug caused tumors to appear on the cervices and vaginas

of some of the rats.1 71 After balancing the factors involved, a rape
victim may not want to avail herself of AZT prcphylaxis treatment
until she is sure that she has not been exposed to the virus.
B.

Timeliness of Information

It is apparent from this discussion that the HIV test results of
the attacker are most valuable to the victim when they are received
as quickly as possible. The Presidential Commission on the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus has recommended that a rapist be tested
and the results be given to the victim at the earliest possible juncture

in the criminal justice process.172 Victims' rights organizations and
many lawyers believe that the "rights and needs of victims of crime

should be paramount in the legal, medical and mental health response to AIDS. 1 73 The judge in a recent New York case shared
this sentiment and ordered a convicted rapist to submit to a blood
test for AIDS diagnosis because it was "the intelligent, humane, logical and proper course of action under the circumstances. '7
VII.

Statutory Response

Even though many agree that testing sexual offenders is "logical," the response of the state and federal legislatures to the plight of
the victims of sexual assault has not been overwhelming. To date,
168. The current cost for AZT is $8,000 per year per patient. GUNDERSON, supra note
125, at 23.
169. MORBIDITY, supra note 164, at 4. Side effects include granulocytopenia, anemia,
headaches, nausea, insomnia, nyalgia, diaphoresis, fever, malaise, anorexia, diarrhea, dysripsia,
vomiting, dyspnea, rash and taste abnormalities. MORBIDITY, supra note 164, at 4.

170.
171.

MORBIDITY,
MORBIDITY,

supra note 164, at 4.
supra note 164, at 12.

172. Report of the Presidential Commission, supra note 10, at 13.
173. Burnley, supra note 7, at 4.
174. People v. Thomas, 529 N.Y.S.2d 429, 431 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1988). The judge ordered the test regardless of the fact that there was no statute authorizing him to do so. The
judge relied on N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40(2)(b)(v) that gives judges the power to order
blood testing subject to "constitutional limitations." Since the Senate had recently unanimously approved mandatory AIDS testing for all convicted sex offenders in the federal system,
the judge believed ordering the test in this instance was "reasonable." Id. This case was not
appealed to a higher court, and its ability to withstand reversal is dubious since §
240.40(2)(b)(v) only allows blood to be taken when it is necessary to prove a defendant's guilt.
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only nine states have passed laws requiring sex offenders to submit to
testing. 17 5 Congress, however, has passed a law requiring convicted
176
sex and drug offenders in federal prisons to undergo such testing.
In the remainder of the United States, there are no provisions addressing the dilemma. In fact, it is a crime in many jurisdictions to
divulge someone's AIDS status to a third party without the person's
approval.'"
A.

Post-Conviction Testing

The mandatory testing statutes that are presently in place vary
in terms of the due process protection they afford defendants and the
time at which victims are allowed to demand the results. In Illinois,
a defendant cannot be compelled to submit to the test for HIV until
he is convicted .1 8 Like all similar statutes, only "appropriately licensed medical practitioners" may perform the test.' 79 The authorities keep the results confidential, but the judge has the discretion to
disclose the results to the victim if the circumstances warranty the
disclosure.' 80
Similarly, in West Virginia, HIV tests cannot be compelled until the defendant is convicted of the sexual offense. 8' The authorities
must keep the results confidential, but the victim can obtain access
to the results by obtaining a court order upon a showing of a compelling need which cannot be accommodated by other means."' "Inassessing compelling need, the court shall weigh the need for the disclosure against the privacy interest of the test subject and the public
interest."' 83 This weighing of the factors incorporates the constitutional balancing approach into the statutory language.
In Indiana, the victim must also wait until after the defendant
is convicted before an HIV test can be ordered by the court. 84 If the
85
tests are positive, the victim will then be notified.1
Finally, in the state of Washington, a sex offender cannot be
175. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
176. Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-381, § 2660(1)(c)(4), 104 STAT. 576, 615 (1990).
177. Troyan A. Brennan, AIDS and the Limits of Confidentiality, 4 J. OF GEN. INTERNAL MED. 242 (1989).
178. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3(9) (Smith-Hurd 1990).

179. Id.
180. Id.
181.
182.

W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-2(f)(2) (1990).
Id. at § 16-3C-3(a)(87)(i).

183.

Id.

184.
185.

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-10.5(a)(1) (Burns 1990).
Id. at § 35-38-1-10.6(a).
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compelled to submit to an AIDS test until he has been convicted and
sentenced.' 86 There is no explicit provision in the law permitting a
victim to request the results of the test. 187 The victim must attempt
to gain access to the test results of her assailant by obtaining a court
order upon a showing of good cause. 188
B.

Pre-Conviction Testing

Four states do, however, permit HIV testing of sex offenders
before conviction. In Colorado, following a preliminary hearing, the
court will order any person held over for trial for any sexual offense
involving sexual penetration to undergo HIV testing. 189 The court
has the authority to disclose the results to the alleged victim if she so
requests. 90 To encourage defendants to voluntarily submit to the
tests, the Colorado statute provides that voluntary submission will be
admissible in mitigation of sentence if the person is later convicted of
the offense. 9'
The Code of Criminal Procedure of Texas provides that any
person indicted for a sexual offense shall, at the court's discretion,
undergo HIV testing. 9 ' The court may direct that the test be done
by its own motion or at the request of the alleged victim. 93 The
court then notifies the victim of the results, but the prosecution cannot use the results against the defendant in any criminal proceeding
arising out of the alleged offense (i.e., criminal transmission of the
disease).194
Florida's statute is the most vague and poorly drafted of the
laws mandating HIV testing for sex offenders. Uinder this statute, a
defendant can be tested for HIV without his consent if the alleged
victim obtains a court order, and both the victim and the defendant
receive the results.' 95 Aside from the requirement of a court order,
no other due process protection is provided to the defendant.
186. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.340(1)(a) & (2) (West 1990).
187. Id. Only law enforcement officers, firefighters, health care providers, health care
facility staff persons and other such workers who experience occupational exposure to another
person's bodily fluids can seek to have a test performed on that person. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 70.24.340(4). These persons may have access to the results. Id. at § 70.24.105(2)(h).
188. Id. at § 70.24.105(2)(b).
189. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-415 (1988).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 21.31 (West 1989).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.609(3)(i)(6) (West 1990).
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California'sScheme

As discussed earlier, California has a unique array of
mandatory HIV testing statutes.1 9 6 Three of these statutes deal with
sex offenders.19 7 The primary purpose of Section 1524.1 of the California Penal Code is to protect the health of the victims of sex
crimes.' 98 This statute provides that a victim of a sexual assault may
request HIV testing of her alleged assailant after the defendant is
charged by a complaint, information, or indictment with a sexual
offense.' 99 However, before the courts can compel the test, a search
warrant for the purpose of testing the accused's blood must be
obtained.2 0
Before issuing a warrant, the court will conduct a hearing to
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused committed the offense and that blood, semen or other bodily
fluid capable of transmitting HIV has been transferred from the accused to the victim.2 0' The court conducts the hearing using testimony from both the victim and the alleged assailant, as well as affidavits, counter affidavits and medical reports regarding the facts that
support or rebut the issuance of the warrant. 2 Upon the required
findings, the court will order the defendant to submit to testing and
will disclose the results to the victim. 2 0 3 However, these results cannot be used as evidence of either guilt or innocence or in the contem2 04
plation of further charges against the defendant.
Another California statute designed to protect victims of sexual
crimes is found in the California Health and Safety Code.20 5 The
law provides that a victim may request that the accused be tested for
HIV infection upon the filing of a criminal complaint that alleges a
196. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
197. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.1 (West 1990); CAL. PENAL CODE
1990); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.06 (West 1990).
198. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1(a) (West 1990).
199. Id. at § 1524.1(b)(1).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at § 1524.1(b)(2).

203.

CAL. PENAL CODE

§

1524.1 (West

§ 1524.1(g) (West 1990).

204. Id. at § 1524.1(k). Section 1524.1 is unique in that it also provides for counseling
for the victim before any test request is made. The counseling helps her understand the extent
to which the circumstances of the assault may or may not have put her at risk of transmission
of the virus from the accused and the benefits and limitation of the HIV tests available. This
helps the victim decide whether or not he or she wants to request the test. Id. at §
1524.1(c)(1).
205. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.95, 199.96 (West 1990). These statutes are
the result of a voter initiative approved by the electorate of California on November 8, 1988.
Id.
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sexual crime.20 6 The court will grant such a request after a hearing
if it concludes that there is probable cause to believe that a possible
transfer of bodily fluids occurred. °7 Upon such a showing, the court
will order the test to be performed, and the results will be released to
the victim.2 08 This statute appears to be overly broad because a court

can order the test if the victim can show the transfer of any bodily
fluid, regardless of whether the fluid is known to be capable of transmitting the virus.2°
The last California statute that mandates H IV testing for sexual offenders is not aimed at protecting victims, and testing under
the statute cannot be ordered until the defendant has been convicted
of a sexual offense.210
VIII.

Statutory Recommendations

In light of the urgent circumstances facing victims of rape, the
best statute would be one that allows for testing as soon as possible
after the alleged assailant has been apprehended, preferably before
conviction. Such a statute should provide the defendant with due
process protection, vis-a-vis a pre-test hearing to determine if compelling need for the test exists. The law should safeguard the confidentiality of the defendant by limiting access to the results to those
who need the information-such as the victim, the defendant, and
possibly the medical staff at the correctional facility to which the
defendant may ultimately be sent. The law should also provide that
no further criminal charges or enhanced sentence will result from
the information gleaned from the test. Such a provision would guard
against challenges to the law on self-incrimination grounds and ensure that the courts will apply the less stringent administrative
search analysis.
Currently, the best drafted law on the subject of mandatory
HIV testing for sex offenders is the California Penal Code, section
1524.1. This statute affords due process protection to the defendant
through both the warrant requirement and the hearing conducted to
determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the defendant committed the crime and that fluids capable of transmitting the
206.

Id. at § 199.96.

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.1 (West 1990). This law does not provide for disclosure
to the victim. However, it does allow for disclosure to the prosecutor for the sole purpose of
preparing counts for a subsequent offense or sentence enhancement.
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virus were exchanged.2 ' The law also provides for pre-testing counseling of the victim2 12 which helps alleviate the problem of requests
for unnecessary tests. The law only supersedes existing confidentiality statutes to the extent that the victim shall receive the results if
they are positive and that she may disclose the information as she
deems necessary to protect her health and the health of others. 21
The fact that the prosecution cannot use tests results as evidence of
guilt or innocence of criminal charges 214 is also desirable. This statute should serve as a model for those states that have not yet taken
this necessary step toward protecting the interests of victims of sexual crimes. It strikes an extremely fair balance between the needs of
the victim and the rights of the defendant.
IX. Judicial Analysis
New laws empowering courts to mandate HIV testing for sexual
offenders should be scrutinized according to the standards set forth
in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n. Courts will need to
determine (1) "whether the blood testing scheme arises from a 'special need' beyond the needs of ordinary law enforcement and (2) if
so, whether the intrusion of compulsory blood testing for AIDS,
without probable cause or individualized suspicion that the AIDS virus will be found in the tested person's blood, is justified by that
need." 2 15 The California Court of Appeals followed this approach
when it upheld the constitutionality of one of California's mandatory
AIDS testing laws 211 in a case where the accused was tested after
biting a peace officer.21
The first prong of the above-stated analysis is clearly satisfied in
the context of victims requesting AIDS testing of sex offenders. If
the statute provides that no criminal charges or sentence enhancement will result from the information, the sole purpose of the test is
to protect the mental and physical well-being of the victim and other
innocent parties. This purpose seems analogous to the "special need"
found in Skinner21a of keeping the nation's transportation system
free of workers who abuse drugs or alcohol, as well as to the "special
211. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1(b)(1) (West 1990).
212. Id. at § 1524.1(c)(1).
213. Id. at § 1524.1(a), (g) & (i).
214. Id. at § 1524.1(k).
215. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Ct., 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
216. The laws being challenged were CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 199.95 et seq.
(West 1990), which mandate testing of a defendant before conviction.
217. Johnetta J., 267 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
218. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
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need" presented in T.L.O. 219 of maintaining security, order, and an
environment in which learning can take place in our nation's schools.
The second prong of the analysis is essentially a balancing test
to determine whether the governmental interests being served by the
test outweigh the intrusion upon the person being tested. The intrusion involved, the taking of the sex offender's blood, is a minimal
one. 220 As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has deemed blood
testing a "common place" and insignificant intrusion.22 1 Provided
that access to the test results is limited to those who have a compelling need to receive the information, the invasion of privacy of the
accused is minimal and should not be a barrier to the enforcement of
the law.2 2
These minimal intrusions upon the sex offender will be weighed
against the very important governmental interests served by the
mandated HIV test. Protecting the health and mental well-being of a
rape victim is surely a legitimate governmental interest. Also, upon
receiving this information, the victim will be able to take precautions
against infecting others. Finally, since there is a very real chance
that the sexual assault resulted in the transmission of the virus, 2
the "low probability" flaw 224 found in the Glover case does not
apply.
Aside from these factors, one should also consider the benefits
to the sex offender himself that can result from the test. Most
asymptomatic carriers of HIV do not know that they are infected.
Hence, they might be in a better position after having the test performed. 225 These benefits are similar to those that inure to the victim; he can seek psychological counseling, avoid stress to his immune
system, and seek medical treatment. 226 More importantly, he can
seek experimental treatments that may become available which
could actually enrich his quality of life. 27
In conclusion, a carefully drafted statute authorizing mandated
testing of sexual offenders should pass constitutional muster. Therefore, the only barrier to the passage of these necessary laws is the
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966).
See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
See text supra p.3.
Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461, 463

(8th Cir. 1989) (quoting Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office, 686 F. Supp. 243,
251 (D. Neb. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989)).

225. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 308 (Remarks by Prof. Harold Edgar).
226. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 308 (Remarks by Prof. Harold Edgar).
227.

See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 308 (Remarks by Prof. Harold Edgar).
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inaction of our state legislatures.
X. Conclusion
It is indisputable that laws requiring sexual offenders to submit
to HIV tests at the victim's request are necessary. The chances of
transmission of HIV through sexual assault are far from theoretical.22 8 The fear that this creates in the mind of one faced with this
terrible possibility can only be fully understood by those going
through the trauma of a sexual assault recovery. However, this fear
is often an unnecessary ordeal since it can be alleviated by requiring
the accused to submit to an HIV test. When a law providing for
compulsory testing of sexual offenders provides that no further criminal penalty will result from the test, the courts should apply a balancing test to the scheme. The benefits to the victim and society's
important interest in protecting those who have been victimized by
crime far outweigh the minimal intrusion on the defendant's interests that accompanies the HIV test.
Therefore, there is no reason why laws requiring sexual offenders to submit to HIV tests should not be enacted. The absence of
such laws has resulted in a "gap" in the criminal justice system in
many states. The existence of this "gap" constitutes an open invitation for abuse of the system by sexual offenders who may presently
see an advantage in refusing to submit to the test voluntarily. By
granting lenient treatment for submission to the HIV test, prosecutors allow sexual offenders to take advantage of the rape victim's
fears one more time. State legislators should act swiftly to close this
"gap" by empowering the courts to order rape defendants to under
HIV testing at the victim's request. These laws are beneficial to both
the victims of rape and the criminal justice system.
Kevin A. McGuire

228.

See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.

